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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff's appeal is from the final judgment of Judge Roger 
A. Livingston of the Third Circuit Court in and for Summit 
County, State of Utah entered December 8, 1992, R. 270-74, 
granting summary judgment for defendant-appellee and dismissing 
plaintiff-appellant's complaint with prejudice. An amended 
notice of appeal was filed on December 17, 1992. R. 275-276. 
This court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(d). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented in this matter is whether the trial 
court was correct in holding that Section 2.3 of the contract 
between the parties, which provides that the terms of the 
contract supersede and control over any conflicting Board policy 
or action, is invalid as an unlawful limitation on the Board's 
legislative authority.1 
Section 2.3 of the Master Contract provides the 
following: 
2.3 Agreement Supersedes Policy - In case of any 
direct conflict between the express provisions of this agreement 
and any Board of Education policy, practice, procedure, custom or 
writing not incorporated in this agreement, this agreement shall 
control. 
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The appropriate standard of review is correction of error. 
Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, (Utah 
1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes are referred to herein and are set 
out verbatim below. 
UCA S 34-20-7 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to 
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and 
to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; and such employees 
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such 
activities. 
UCA S 53A-3-402(14)(a) 
(a) A board shall make and enforce rules necessary for the 
control and management of the district schools. 
(b) All board rules and policies shall be in writing, filed, 
and referenced for public access. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Association commenced this action on behalf of two of 
its members, part-time teachers who claim entitlement to health 
insurance for the 1989-90 school year under the terms of a 
contract entered by the Board and the Association. The 
Association seeks damages for the two teachers as well as 
declaratory and injunctive relief. The Board defended by 
asserting that the two teachers in question elected to enter 
individual contracts with the Board, the terms of which 
specifically exclude them from insurance coverage. 
The Association's complaint was filed in Third Judicial 
District Court for Summit County on April 12, 1990. R. 2-19. 
Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment. R. 35-37, 187-188. The Board also moved to have the 
case transferred to Third Circuit Court. R. 35-37. The motion 
to transfer was granted, and the case was transferred to the 
Third Circuit Court on April 27, 1992. R. 219. Following oral 
argument on the two motions for summary judgment, R. 256, the 
Court ordered on September 16, 1992 that the Board's motion for 
summary judgment be granted, that the Association's motion be 
denied, and accordingly dismissed the complaint with prejudice. 
R. 257-58. The Court entered written conclusions of law on 
December 8, 1992. R. 270-74. The Association's appeal followed. 
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STATEMENT OP FACTS 
On September 21, 1988 the Board and the Association entered 
a two year agreement. R. 55-56 (ff 1, 3). The text of the 
contract is found at R. 7-18 and R. 157-218. The contract 
recognizes at Section 2.1 that "the Board has certain powers, 
discretion and duties, that under the Constitution and Laws of 
the State of Utah, may not be delegated, limited or abrogated by 
agreement with any party . . .." On June 27, 1989, the Board 
adopted policy GCDA which provides that employees working less 
than 25 hours per week are not eligible for health and accident 
insurance coverage. R. 109. A copy of Policy GCDA is included 
in the appendix at A-2. 
By letter dated June 28, 1989, the Board informed 
Association member, Nancy Schulthess, that the Board had voted to 
offer her a one year job share teaching position with the 
District for the 1989-90 school year. R. 108. A copy of the 
letter is included in the appendix at A-3. The contract was 
offered under the guidelines of the previously adopteid Policy 
-* GCDA. A copy of Policy GCDA was included with the June 28, 1989 
letter. R. 109. 
Ms. Schulthess signed the June 28, 1989 letter with the copy 
of Policy GCDA attached on June 30, 1989 indicating her 
acceptance of the position. R. 116. On December 12, 1989 Ms. 
Schulthess signed a one year job share contract for the 1989 to 
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1990 school year. R. Ill, 116. A copy of the contract is 
included in the appendix at A-4. 
The contract between Ms. Schulthess and the Board 
specifically provides that the Board and Ms. Schulthess are bound 
by the rules and regulations as set forth in the policies and 
procedures of the Board, as they may be amended from time to 
time. R. 111. Under the terms of her contract, Ms. Schulthess 
agreed to work 20 hours per week. R. 111. 
Association member Margery Hadden was aware that Policy GCDA 
was adopted on or about June 27, 1989. R. 139-140. Ms. Hadden 
signed a one year, job share contract on December 15, 1989 
providing for half-time employment during the 1989-90 school 
year. R. 113, 139-140. A copy of the contract is included in 
the appendix at A-5. 
The contracts between Ms. Hadden and the Board and Ms. 
Schulthess and the Board specifically provide that the parties 
are bound by the rules and regulations as set forth in the 
policies and procedures of the District, as they may be amended 
from time to time. R. Ill, 113. Under the terms of Policy GCDA 
the two part-time teachers are not entitled to insurance 
benefits. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Association alleges that the Board is restricted in its 
actions by the terms of the master contract. It attempts to 
enforce a provision of the master contract which states that if 
the terms of the contract conflict with the Board's policies or 
actions, the master contract prevails. If binding, such a 
contractual provision would be an unlawful limitation on the 
Board's legislative and decision making authority. The Board 
cannot be precluded from amending its policies, adopting 
additional policies or rescinding existing policies. The Board 
is statutorily required to make and enforce rules necessary for 
the control and management of the district's schools, including 
setting and maintaining a budget for the district, governing 
employee wages and benefits, and many additional matters vital to 
the operation of the district. This Court has already held that 
legislative bodies cannot delegate their authority, and Utah law 
is clear that no agreement can lawfully supersede the board's 
authority and duty to act. 
The Utah Attorney General's office has also determined 
stating that a board of education cannot subject modification of 
its policies to the approval of a local teachers' association or 
union. An attempt to enter such an agreement is not be within 
the legislative intent for the operation of local districts. 
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This court's decisions and the Utah Attorney General's 
office have made clear that a board is free to modify and repeal 
policies adopted by its predecessor boards. A school board 
cannot bar itself or future board from adopting subsequent 
resolutions which may alter earlier established policies. 
Collective bargaining agreements, where allowed, may not include 
delegation or surrender of a statutory duty. The Association's 
interpretation of the master contract would wrest from the board 
its authority to make binding policies and to modify, amend, or 
repeal its own policies. This is clearly contrary to controlling 
law. 
The master contract itself recognizes that certain powers, 
discretion and duties of the board may not be delegated, limited 
or abrogated by agreement with any party. The Association's 
argument that collective bargaining agreements are enforceable 
regardless of the substance of those agreements is not supported 
by the Association's own agreement with the board. Thus, to the 
extent the master contract attempts to limit the decision making 
authority of the Board, the master contract is unlawful. In 
addition, the cases relied upon by the Association are 
distinguishable, and in fact support the very position opposed by 
the Association in this appeal. 
The Association also argues that Utah statutes allow the 
Board to enter any contract, regardless of the terms of that 
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contract and regardless of whether or not it delegates or 
abrogates the Board's authority. However, the plain language of 
UCA § 53-A-3-411(l) only limits the term of lawful agreements. 
It does not in any way allow the Board to unlawfully delegate its 
authority, and does not validate otherwise unlawful contracts. 
Utah law allows individuals to contract directly with their 
employer regardless of existing collective bargaining agreements. 
The Association alleges that the Board is prohibited from 
negotiating directly with the Association's individual members 
because it claims the master contact supersedes those individual 
negotiations and contracts. UCA § 34-20-7 specifically provides 
that while employees to have the right to bargain collectively, 
they also have the right not to bargain collectively. The two 
members of the Association involved in this action both entered 
into contracts expressly subject to the Board's policy GCDA, 
which had been adopted prior to the time the individual contracts 
were entered. The teachers knew that those contracts did not 
entitle them to any benefits and they chose to enter the 
contracts with that clear understanding. By doing so they 
exercised their right to bargain with the Board individually. 
They cannot now claim that those contracts are unenforceable due 
to the existence of a master contract. 
The Association argues extensively that collective 
bargaining agreements are allowed under Utah law. However, that 
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issue is not before this court. The sole issue on appeal is 
whether f 2.3 of the master contract is an invalid and lawful 
limitation on the Board's legislative authority. The court 
should not and need not decide whether collective bargaining is 
appropriate for public employees under Utah law. Regardless, 
this court has already held that in the absence of exclusive 
legislative language, statutes governing labor relations only 
apply to private industry and not to the state or its 
subdivisions. This court has also declared that public employees 
in this state generally have no collective bargaining rights. 
Therefore, there is no statutory collective bargaining right for 
public employees' associations in Utah. The vast majority of 
states hold that in the absence of such express statutory 
authority public officials do not have authority to enter 
collective bargaining agreements with public employees. 
The law in Utah is clear that a board of education may not 
delegate its decision making authority or restrict or limit its 
authority through private agreement or through its own action. 
The authority of subsequent boards of education may not be 
limited by the actions of a prior board. The Association's 
interpretation of the master contract would prevent the Board 
from acting pursuant to statutory direction and exercising its 
legislative decision making authority to direct the affairs of 
the district. The Board would not be able to act to set or 
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direct its budget; or to negotiate and contract directly with its 
employees. The Board would be bound by the actions of prior 
Boards, with no ability to act in the interests of the district 
schools. The Circuit Court was correct when it determined that f 
2.3 of the master contract is an unlawful restriction on the 
Board's authority and the judgment of the Circuit Court should be 
affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
The Association alleges that the Board is bound by the terms 
of the master contract, and that if the terms of the contract 
conflict with the Board's policies, the master contract prevails. 
For the reasons stated below, the Circuit Court correctly 
determined that this provision is an unlawful restriction on the 
legislative authority of the Board and constitutes an unlawful 
delegation and surrender of the Board's authority and 
responsibility to govern the affairs of the District. In 
particular, the Association's interpretation of the master 
contract denies the Board the right to control its own policies 
regarding such vital matters as employee benefits and wages. The 
Association's interpretation of the master contract would allow 
one board to restrict the authority of a subsequently elected 
board. It would prevent the Board from setting and governing its 
own budget, as required by statute. It would also prevent the 
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Board from entering contracts directly with its own employees. 
Assuming without admitting that collective bargaining agreements 
are authorized under Utah law for public employee associations, a 
review of the Association's arguments reveals that many if not 
all of its cited authorities stand simply for the principal that 
collective bargaining agreements should be allowed. However, the 
issue presented before the court in these proceedings is whether 
the specific provision of the master contract taking rule making 
authority away from the Board is an unlawful restriction on the 
Board's legislatively-mandated authority to govern the affairs of 
the district. Clearly such restrictions are not allowed. 
As an additional and independent basis for the Court's 
decision to grant Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment, Utah 
law expressly allows individuals to contract directly with their 
employer regardless of any existing collective bargaining 
agreement. That is precisely what the Association's members have 
done in this case. Their contracts were made directly with the 
District on an individual basis and are controlling. The 
individual contracts determine with certainty that the 
Association's members, Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden, have no 
rights to the disputed benefits. 
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A. The Board May Not Be Precluded From Adopting or 
Amending Its Policies. 
The Association has alleged that the Board should be bound 
by the terms of the master contract, and that if the terms of the 
master contract conflict with the Board's policies, the master 
contract should prevail. The Association cites § 2.3 of the 
master contract entitled "Agreement Supersedes Policy". Section 
2.3 states: 
In case of any direct conflict between the 
express provisions of this agreement and any 
Board of Education policy, practice, 
procedure, custom or writing not incorporated 
in this agreement, this Agreement shall 
control. [Emphasis added.] 
Under the Association's interpretation, this contractual 
provision would prevent the Board from amending its policies 
regarding benefits, compensation, personnel, termination and many 
other essential matters, thus taking away the Board's ability to 
properly and responsibly manage its affairs according to 
statutory requirements and standards. If binding, such a 
contractual provision would be an unlawful limitation on the 
Board's legislative authority. The Board of Education cannot be 
precluded from amending its policies, adopting additional 
policies, or rescinding existing policies, as these 
responsibilities have been specifically delegated to the Board by 
statute. UCA § 53A-3-402(14) issues a statutory mandate to the 
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Board to make and enforce rules necessary for the control and 
management of the district schools. In addition, the Board has 
many other statutory duties and responsibilities. See UCA § 53A-
3-402 generally. As shown herein, no agreement can lawfully 
supersede the Board's authority and duty to act. 
The principle that a legislative body cannot delegate, 
assign or restrict its decision making authority is set forth 
clearly in Salt Lake City v. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 563 
P.2d 786 (Utah 1977). In that case, the state legislature 
enacted the Firefighters Negotiation Act. One provision of the 
Act called for mandatory binding arbitration by an independent 
panel if the municipality could not agree on contract terms with 
its firefighters. The court held that the legislature cannot 
relinquish the decision making authority of the legislative body 
to a private entity, in that case an arbitrator, especially when 
the private entity is not accountable within the political 
process. 
The legislature may not surrender its 
legislative authority to a body where the 
public interest is subjected to the interest 
of a group which may be antagonistic to the 
public interest. 
Id. at 789. 
The court continued, stating that such delegation "is not 
consistent with the constitutional exercise of political power 
and a representative democracy." Id. The court then broadened 
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its holding to apply generally to all those who have been elected 
by a given constituency. 
Although the old delegation doctrine has been 
repudiated, there remains an underlying core 
of validity, which requires those who have 
been selected, by a given process, and from a 
given constituency, retain the power to make 
ultimate policy decisions and override 
decisions made by others. 
Salt Lake City. 563 P.2d at 790. 
The Board is an elected body, representing the electorate 
of the Park City School District. It holds decision making and 
policy making powers which cannot be delegated or restricted by 
agreement with private entities such as the plaintiff. Thus, the 
provision of the master contract which purports to override all 
conflicting Board policies is contrary to law and unenforceable. 
The Association argues that the Salt Lake City case is 
distinguishable from the present case because the master contract 
"contains no provision delegating any portion of the Board's 
legislative authority to PCEA, to an arbitrator, or to any other 
body". Brief of Appellant at 17. However, the Board does not 
argue that this is a case involving delegation of responsibility 
to an arbitration panel. This is a case involving a contract 
provision, which, if enforced, would constitute an absolute 
surrender of the Board's legislatively delegated authority to 
govern its affairs through the enactment, amendment and recision 
of its policies. If the authority to make decisions on such 
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matters cannot be delegated to another party, it certainly cannot 
be surrendered or abdicated at the request of another party. 
The Utah Attorney General's office has also interpreted the 
Salt Lake City case to state specifically that a Board of 
Education cannot subject modification of its policies to the 
approval of a local teacher's association or union. Utah Att'y 
Gen. Op. No. 86-40, August 11, 1986. An attempt to enter such an 
agreement would not be "within the legislative intent for 
operation of local districts." Id. at 1. The opinion continued: 
It is clear that local boards of education 
have the power to make policy and pass 
regulations. Making general policy for 
operation of the school district is clearly 
legislative in nature, and it is generally 
held that where this legislative policy 
making function is conferred upon a local 
board, the board cannot delegate this 
legislative power onto others. Antieu on 
Local Governmental Law. Volume 3A, §30Q: 404; 
Godbey v. Roosevelt School Dist., 131 Ariz. 
13, 638 P.2d 235 (Ariz. App. 1981). 
Thus, for a locally elected board to 
authorize a particular policy to be changed, 
altered or amended only by mutual agreement 
or consent of a private group with no 
responsibility to the public appears clearly 
to be beyond the legal authority of the board 
and contrary to the legislative intent for 
the elected board alone to maintain 
responsibility for and control of the 
operation of the district. 73 C.J.S. Public 
Administrative Law and Procedure, Section 92; 
Allen v. Board of Educ., 120 Utah 556, 236 
P.2d 756 (Utah 1951); Johnson v. State Tax 
Comm'n. 17 Utah 2d 337, 411 P.2d 831 (Utah 
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1966); Salt Lake City v. Intfl Assfn of 
Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786 (Utah 1977). 
In my opinion, a policy which can only be altered or 
amended by agreement or consent of a private group is 
beyond the legal authority of the board, is contrary to 
legislative intent, and is invalid to the extent such 
consent or agreement must be obtained. 
Id. at 3. 
Thus, under Utah law an attempt by the Association to bind 
the Board to a contract term which purports to supersede any 
conflicting Board policy is invalid and unlawful. The Board may 
not delegate its ability to act in its legislative ceipacity. 
That capacity includes the ability of the Board to at all times 
adopt, amend or rescind its policies according to the best 
interest of the district and its students. UCA § 53A-3-402(14). 
The Utah Supreme court and the Utah Attorney General's 
opinion also make clear that a board is free to modify or repeal 
policies adopted by prior boards of education for th€> district. 
See Utah Att'y Gen. No. Op. 86-40, August 11, 1986 at 4. A 
school board cannot bar itself or future boards from adopting 
subsequent resolutions which may alter earlier established 
policies. This is a well-established principle applicable to all 
bodies with legislative powers. In People's Advocate, Inc. v. 
Superior Court, suit was brought to challenge a statutory 
initiative measure adopted at a recent election. Part of the 
initiative sought to govern the content of future legislation. 
- 16 -
In striking that provision of the initiative, the Court agreed 
that: 
[the provision] runs afoul of the familiar 
principle of law that no legislative board, by 
normal legislative enactment, may divest itself or 
future boards of the power to enact legislation 
within its competence. (City and County of San 
Francisco v. Cooper. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 898, 929, 
120 Cal. Rptr. 707, 534 P.2d 403; see also In re 
Collie, supra, 38 Cal.2d at p. 398; French v. 
Senate, supra, 146 Cal. at p. 608, 80 p. 1031.) 
181 Cal. App.3d at 328, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 646-47. The Court then 
concluded that "neither house of the legislature may bind its own 
hands or those of future legislatures by adopting rules not 
capable of change." Id. 
The courts in California again stated this well-established 
rule of law in City and County of San Francisco v. Patterson, 202 
Cal. App.3d 95, 248 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Cal. App. 1988). In that 
case, a proposed initiative ordinance would have barred future 
boards of education from entering into real property leases for 
greater than certain periods of time at less than certain values. 
Suit was brought to prevent adoption and enforcement of the 
proposed ordinance. The plaintiffs argued that the people cannot 
employ the initiative process to bind future boards, which the 
Board itself cannot do. The Court agreed with plaintiff's 
reasoning, and cited Cooper. supra. 
In City and County of San Francisco v. Cooper. (1975) 13 
Cal.3d 898, 929, 120 Cal. Rptr. 707, 534 P.2d 403, the Board of 
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Education entered an agreement with a council of employee 
representatives which was later adopted by resolution of the 
Board. The agreement and resolution included a provision which 
purported to preclude the Board from subsequently revising or 
altering any of the other provisions of the resolution without 
approval of the employee representatives. A taxpayer brought 
suit to challenge the resolution, claiming inter alia that the 
provision in question effected a delegation of the Board's 
ultimate decision-making authority. The Court agreed, stating: 
It is a familiar principle of law that no 
legislative board, by normal legislative 
enactment, may divest itself or future boards of 
the power to enact legislation within its 
competence. [Citations omitted.] Thus, a school 
board cannot, by resolution, bar itself or future 
boards from adopting subsequent resolutions which 
may alter earlier established policies. Yet the 
portion of the resolution presently at issue 
purports to effectuate just such a result; it 
seeks to place all the terms of the present 
resolution beyond the reach of future board 
action, except as the certificated employee 
council agrees to such future action. Under the 
authorities cited above, such a provision cannot 
stand. 
Cooper, 534 P.2d at 423. As in Cooper and the other cases 
relying on Cooper, the Association's interpretation of the master 
contract is an attempt to prevent the Board from exercising its 
ultimate decision-making authority. Its interpretation would 
prevent this Board and future boards from exercising that 
authority to govern its affairs through the enactment, recision 
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and amendment of its own policies. Such an interpretation bars 
the Board from controlling benefits to its employees in light of 
existing budget constraints. The Board cannot be contractually 
restricted from enforcing or implementing its policies. To the 
extent the master contract purports to restrict the Board's 
decision making authority, it is unlawful. 
In Raines v. Independent School Dist. No. 6, 796 P.2d 303 
(Okla. 1990), the board of education entered a collective 
bargaining agreement with the local education association. The 
agreement required that teacher grievances be submitted to 
binding arbitration. When a teacher attempted to implement the 
arbitration provision, the board refused unless the arbitrator's 
decision was only advisory. The court held that a school board 
may not negotiate a term in a collective bargaining agreement 
which involves delegation of a statutory duty or surrender of 
this duty vested in the board by statute. Id. at 304. See also, 
Mindemann v. Independent School Dist. No. 6, 771 P.2d 996 (Okla. 
1989) . Similarly, the Board in this case cannot relinquish its 
authority and responsibility to enact and amend rules necessary 
to govern the district. By claiming that the master contract 
supersedes all Board policies and actions, the Association takes 
the position that the Board has contracted away its right to 
exercise its decision making authority. The ultimate effect of 
the Utah Education Association's position is to wrest from the 
- 19 -
Board its authority to make binding policies including the 
authority to set and govern its own budget. It also prevents the 
Board from entering contracts directly with its own employees. 
This is contrary to controlling law. 
It is the responsibility of the party contracting with a 
governmental body to be aware of the unlawful nature of attempted 
delegation of authority. The court in Miller v. School Dist. No. 
470, 744 P.2d 865 (Kan. App. 1987) stated: 
One who makes a contract with a municipal 
corporation is bound to take notice of 
limitations on its power to contract and also 
of the power of the particular officer or 
agency to make the contract. The municipal 
corporation cannot in any manner bind itself 
by any contract which is beyond the scope of 
its powers, and all persons contracting with 
the corporation are deemed to know its 
limitations in this respect. 
Id. at 869. Thus, the Association is deemed to be on notice of 
the unlawful nature of its attempt to restrict the Board's 
authority through the master contract.2 
That a board of education has authority to contract 
directly with its employees is evident from the powers 
statutorily granted to all local boards of education, as well as 
from related statutes governing rights of a board's €>mployees. 
UCA § 53A-3-411(l) states that "a local school board may enter 
into a written employment contract for a term not to exceed five 
years." The power to contract is granted under the statute, with 
no restriction as to with whom the contract may be entered. In 
addition, UCA § 53A-8-103(l) clearly contemplates a board 
contracting directly with its educators, rather that only through 
an anociation, when if states "a local school board shall, by 
contract with its educators or their associations, ..." establish 
termination procedures. Also, employees are empowered to 
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The Association relies heavily upon the Colorado case of 
Littleton Educ. Assfn v. Arapaho County School Dist.. 191 Colo. 
411, 553 P.2d 793 (Colo. 1976). The Association believes that 
this case provides authority to bind a board of education to the 
terms of a collective bargaining agreement regardless of the 
content of those terms. However, a complete reading of the 
Colorado court's decision in Littleton demonstrates that 
Littleton does not support the Association's position. In fact, 
just the opposite is true. 
Littleton involved a collective bargaining agreement between 
the local board of education and Littleton Education Association. 
The agreement provided for submission of employment disputes to 
an impartial fact finder. The court upheld the agreement, but 
not before clearly explaining that under the terms of the 
agreement, the ultimate decisions regarding employment terms and 
conditions remained exclusively with the Board even after the 
collective bargaining agreement had been finalized: 
And we also point out that the subject 
agreement did not provide for binding 
arbitration on the points of disagreement 
when the negotiations broke down as involved 
in Greeley Police Union v. City Council of 
Greeley, Colo. 191 Colo. 419, 553 P.2d 790 
(Colo. 1976). On the contrary, only the 
services of an impartial fact finder are 
provided for. The agreement specifically 
contract either collectively or individually, pursuant to UCA § 
34-20-7. 
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states that the fact finder's report " . . . 
shall be advisory only . . .." If the 
parties are still at an impasse after the 
advisory report of the fact finder, the 
agreement provides that " . . . the board has 
the authority to make the final decision and 
determination on all unresolved issues, 
without further negotiation." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Littleton, 553 P.2d at 796. It was at this point that the court 
held the district bound by the terms of the agreement because: 
Negotiations between an employer and employee 
organization entered into voluntarily as in 
this case, do not require the employer to 
agree with the proposal submitted by 
employees. Rather, the ultimate decisions 
regarding employment terms and conditions 
remain exclusively with the board. While the 
employees1 influence is permitted and felt, 
the control of decision making has not been 
abrogated or delegated. 
Id. 
Thus, the court upheld the collective bargaining agreement 
addressed in Littleton because the resolution dispute* provisions 
required the services of an impartial fact finder whose 
recommendations were only advisory. As the court stated, if the 
parties were then still at an impasse, the Board had the 
authority to make the final decision and determination on the 
unresolved issue, without further negotiation with the 
association. The court's reasoning makes clear that had the 
board not retained its legislatively delegated authority to make 
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the final decision in matters so important to its operation, the 
agreement would not have been upheld. 
Littleton is factually distinguished from the case at hand 
because the master contract provision in this case does not 
provide for the ultimate decision-making authority to rest with 
the board of education; rather, the master contract purports to 
usurp the board's authority to make such final decisions 
regarding its governing policies and clearly abrogates the 
control of the board's decision-making authority. By arguing 
that the master contract controls if in conflict with any Board 
policy or action, the master contract would be an absolute bar to 
any Board effort to regulate its affairs regarding employee 
benefits, salary, personnel and many related matters. Thus, 
Littleton is not supportive of the Association's position in this 
case. It does support the position taken by Utah courts that 
decision making authority may not be abrogated or delegated. It 
must remain in the Board. Agreements which so provide may be 
upheld. Those which do not so provide are unlawful. 
Interestingly, the Littleton court also expressly recognized 
that collective bargaining agreements "must not conflict with 
existing statutes concerning the governance of the state's school 
system". Id. at 797. The Park City master contract provision in 
question would prevent the Board from exercising its authority 
and statutory responsibility to make and enforce rules necessary 
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for the control and management of the District's schools. UCA § 
53A-3-402(14). Therefore, under Littleton, the master contract 
provision cannot be enforced. 
The Association also relies on Louisiana Teachers Assfn v. 
Orleans Parish School Bd.. 303 So.2d 564 (La. App. 1974), which 
concluded that a collective bargaining agreement was binding on 
the district. However, the court did not address the issue of 
whether such an agreement may limit, delegate, or abrogate a 
board's legislatively delegated authority. In fact, the 
agreement in that case was upheld for the very reason that 
"inasmuch as the board has not surrendered any decision making 
authority, we conclude there has been no unlawful delegation." 
Id. at 568. In that case there was no unlawful delegation and 
for that reason the agreement was upheld. The Louisiana case 
simply holds that an agreement which does not unlawfully delegate 
authority may be enforced. This case does not support the 
Association's argument because the master contract does 
unlawfully delegate or restrict the Board's authority. 
The law in Utah is clear that a board of education may not 
delegate or abdicate its legislatively delegated decision making 
authority, particularly where it is given direct responsibility 
to adopt, amend and rescind policies and rules in its continuing 
efforts to properly manage the District schools. The primary 
case relied upon by the Association in its argument to the 
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contrary is in fact contrary to the Association's position. It 
should be noted that the master contract itself recognizes in 
§2.1 that the Board has certain powers which cannot be 
delegated, limited or abrogated by agreement. 
2.1 Limitation of Board Powers - The Board 
has certain powers, discretion and duties, 
that under the constitution and laws of the 
State of Utah, may not be delegated, limited 
or abrogated by agreement with any party. 
Accordingly, if any provision of this 
agreement, or any application of this 
agreement to any future coverage hereby shall 
be found contrary to law, such provision or 
application shall have effect only to the 
extent permitted by law, but all other 
provisions or applications of this agreement 
shall continue in full force and effect. 
The master contract itself recognizes that the Board has 
duties and responsibilities which cannot be abrogated, delegated 
or limited by agreement with other parties. The Association's 
argument that collective bargaining agreements are enforceable 
regardless of the substance of those agreements is not supported 
by the Association's own agreement negotiated with the Board. To 
the extent the master contract attempts to limit the decision 
making authority of the Board through § 2.3, the master contract 
is unlawful. 
The Association also argues that UCA § 53A-3-411(l) allows 
the Board to enter any contract, whether or not the contract 
delegates or abrogates the Board's authority. However, the plain 
language of that section merely limits the term of lawful 
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agreements. It does not in anyway allow the Board to unlawfully 
delegate its authority, and does not validate otherwise unlawful 
contracts. Therefore, the judgment of the Circuit Court should 
therefore be affirmed. 
B. Utah Law Allows Individuals to Contract Directly 
with Their Employer Regardless of Existing 
Collective Bargaining Agreements. 
The Association alleges that the Board is prohibited from 
negotiating directly with the Association's individual members 
because it claims the master contract supersedes those individual 
negotiations and agreements. However, Utah Code Ann. § 34-20-7 
specifically provides that while employees do have a right to 
bargain collectively in Utah, they also have the right not to 
bargain collectively. 
Employees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aide or 
protection; and such employees shall also 
have the right to refrain from any or all 
such activities. 
UCA § 34-20-7 (Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs1 members Nancy 
Schulthess and Margery Hadden voluntarily elected to contract 
with the district directly and signed contracts with the Board 
individually. During the summer and fall of 1989, the plaintiff 
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and the Board were renegotiating the master contract. 
Specifically, the section regarding benefits was under 
renegotiation. While the contract was under renegotiation, both 
Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden entered into contracts subject to 
the Board's policy GCDA, which had been amended during the 
negotiations and before the individual contracts were entered. 
That policy specifically defined the benefits to which they were 
entitled under their contracts with the Board. These teachers 
knew that under the contracts offered by the Board they were not 
entitled to any benefits and they chose to enter the contracts 
with that clear understanding. By doing so they exercised their 
right to bargain with the Board individually. Regardless of what 
they now claim in retrospect, the signed and executed contracts 
between Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden and the Board are clear 
evidence of their intent to contract individually with the Board. 
They cannot now claim that those contracts are unenforceable. 
The importance of an individual's right to contract with an 
employer despite the existence of a collective bargaining 
agreement is supported in Utah Att'y Gen. Op. No. 85-73, March 
11, 1986. There, the Attorney General states that the collective 
bargaining process "is of great importance so long as it does not 
infringe on an individual's right to work or communicate directly 
with his employer, id. at 3. Again in 1988 the Utah Attorney 
General issued a formal opinion, Utah Att'y Gen. Formal Op. 88-
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002, June 13, 1988, affirming its previous position that an 
employee's right to contract directly with his/her employer may 
not be limited by law or by employee associations. 
Unlike a majority of states, Utah is a right 
to work state. Utah's right to work approach 
is premised on a preference for free choices 
of employees as opposed to mandatory union 
membership. An important implication of 
Utah's right to work status, as it effects 
this opinion, is that the basic free choice 
premise generally disfavors union exclusivity 
rights which tend to reduce a worker's right 
of choice. 
Id. at 2. 
The Attorney General's opinion also states that "the Utah 
Constitutional declaration that all men [women] have a right to 
acquire and protect property has been construed as including the 
right to work . . . " citing Golding v. Shuback Optical Co., 93 
Utah 32, 70 P.2d 871 (Utah 1937), and McGrew v. Industrial 
Comm'n. 96 Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608 (Utah 1938). Under Utah law, 
employees have the right to directly contract with their 
employers regardless of a prior collective bargaining agreement. 
This is what these two teachers did. They contacted with the 
District with full knowledge that their contacts were subject to 
the then-existing policy regarding benefits. They cannot now 
attempt a rescission of those individual contracts because they 
find the terms less favorable than those in the collective 
bargaining agreement. 
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C The Right of Public Employees to Bargain 
Collectively is not at Issue in this 
Case. 
The Association argues extensively that collective 
bargaining agreements are or should be allowed under Utah law. 
However, that issue is not before the court. As stated in the 
Association's brief, the specific issue is whether Paragraph 2.3 
of the master contract is an invalid, unlawful limitation of the 
Board's legislative authority. Brief of Appellant at 1, 2. The 
Court should not and need not decide whether collective 
bargaining is appropriate for public employees in order to 
address the issue presented. However, the Utah Supreme Court has 
clearly held that in the absence of exclusive legislative 
language, statutes governing labor relations only apply to 
private industry and not to the state or its subdivisions. 
Westly v. Board of City Comm'rs of Salt Lake City Corp., 573 P.2d 
1279 (Utah 1978). In addition, the Utah Supreme Court has 
declared that "public employees in this state generally have no 
collective bargaining rights." Pratt v. City Council of the City 
of Riverton, 639 P.2d 172, 174 (Utah 1981), citing, Westly v. 
Board of City Comm'rs of Salt Lake City Corp.. supra. As stated 
by the Utah Attorney General, "the clear implication is that 
public employee labor relations are not subject to a special 
labor code in Utah." Utah Att'y Gen. Formal Op. No. 88-002, June 
13, 1988, at 2. Therefore, there is no statutory collective 
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bargaining right for public employees associations in Utah. 
Moreover, the great majority of states hold that in the absence 
of express statutory authority public officials do not have 
authority to enter collective bargaining agreements with public 
employees. Local 2238 AFSCME v. Stratton, 108 N.M. 163, 769 P.2d 
76 (N.M. 1989). The Association's extensive references to 
legislation adopted in the 1993 Legislative Session is not 
relevant. The law applicable is the law in existence at the time 
the case was decided in the Circuit Court.3 Therefore, the 1993 
Legislative enactments have no bearing on this issue. Moreover, 
as stated above, this issue is not before the court and should 
not be addressed in this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The law in Utah is clear that a school board may not 
delegate its decision making authority or restrict or limit its 
authority in any way. The Circuit Court was correct when it 
determined that § 2.3 of the master contract is an unlawful 
A statute cannot be given retroactive effect unless the 
legislature expressly declares such an intent in the statute. 
Washington Nat'l. Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Ass'n, 795 P.2d 665 (Utah 
App. 1990); Matter of Disconnection of Certain Territory from 
Highland City. 668 P.2d 544 (Utah 1983). 
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restriction on the Board's authority, and therefore the judgment 
of the Circuit Court should be affirmed. 
DATED this zc day of July, 1993. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
' Brinton R. Burbidge 
Blake T. Ostler 
Stuart F. Weed 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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" JfiL fr*fr'cW 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PARK CITY EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PARK CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Civil No. 92 CV 0019 
Judge 
This matter comes before the Court on cross Motions for Summary Judgment. 
Defendant Park City School District filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Memorandum in support thereof. Plaintiff Park City Education Association responded 
by filing its own Motion for Summary Judgment together with a joint memorandum in 
opposition to Defendant's motion and memorandum in support of its own motion. 
Defendant then filed a reply memorandum and the motions were submitted for 
decision with a request for oral argument. 
The Court heard arguments by counsel on both Motions on Tuesday, August 4, 
1992. Plaintiff was represented by Robert G. Wing, attorney. Defendant was 
represented by Brinton R. Burbidge, attorney. The Court, having reviewed the 
memoranda in support of and in opposition to the respective Motions for Summary 
Judgment, and having considered the arguments of counsel, makes the following 
Findings and Conclusions of Law. 
Plaintiff brought this action on behalf of two of its members who allege they 
have incurred damages as a result of a dispute in entitlement to health insurance 
coverage. The members are Nancy Shulthess and Margery Hadden. The Plaintiffs 
claims in this matter center on the District's contractual obligations with Ms. Hadden 
and Ms. Schulthess. The undisputed facts are clear that both of these individuals 
entered into a specific contract with the Park City Board of Education for half-time 
employment. Each contract contained the following provision incorporating and 
binding the parties to District policies and procedures: 
5. The Board of Education is bound by the adopted 
rules and regulations as stipulated in the policies and 
procedures. As an employee, you also agree to be 
bound by these rules and regulations as they may be 
amended from time to time. 
Ms. Hadden and Ms. Schulthess entered into their contracts with full knowledge and 
notice of the terms of the policy affecting insurance coverage for half-time or part-time 
employees. The Board of Education adopted the policy in question prior to Ms. 
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Schulthess and Ms. Hadden signing their contracts and prior to the time they began 
their half-time duties for the 1989-1990 school year. Prior to entering their contracts 
with the District, each had notice of and/or received a copy of policy GCDA 
determining entitlement to health and accident insurance coverage. Therefore, this 
policy as well as all of the policies of the District became and were part of the 
contracts between the Board of Education and Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden. 
Therefore, they are bound by the terms of this policy and are not entitled to any 
additional health or accident insurance benefits other than those provided for by that 
policy. Because both teachers contracted for only 20 hours per week, they were not 
eligible for health and accident insurance coverage under the terms of policy GCDA. 
Plaintiff argues that the individual contracts between the two of its members and 
the Board of Education are unenforceable because the members elected to have the 
Plaintiff represent them in contract negotiations. Plaintiff then argues that the Board 
of Education cannot negotiate directly with plaintiffs members and the two individual 
contracts are therefore invalid. In support of its position, Plaintiff draws analogies to 
the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") and its case law. However, there is no 
reference in the master contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendant which can be 
interpreted as incorporating the NLRA or its resultant case law. Also, the NLRA and 
the Utah counterpart thereto are not binding upon the Defendant and do not restrict 
the Defendant's direct negotiations with Plaintiffs members. Therefore, Plaintiffs 
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claims that the individual contracts between the Board of Education and its members 
are invalid is without merit. 
Plaintiff also alleges that the Board of Education is prohibited from negotiating 
directly with Plaintiffs individual members because those members have chosen to be 
represented by the Plaintiff. However, UCA § 34-20-7 specifically provides that while 
employees have a right to bargain collectively, they also have a right not to bargain 
collectively. Individual employees may contract directly with a school district's board of 
education. Plaintiffs members, Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden signed contracts with 
the Board of Education individually. They knew that under the terms of their 
contracts, they were not entitled to any benefits and they chose to enter the contracts 
with that clear understanding. Regardless of what they now claim in retrospect, the 
signed and executed contracts between Ms. Schulthess, Ms. Hadden, and the Board of 
Education are clear evidence of the contract and agreement with the Board. 
Plaintiff also argues that the master contract by its own terms takes precedence 
over Board policies which conflict with the provisions of the master contract. Plaintiff 
argues that policy GCDA cannot be binding upon its members because the master 
contract conflicts with the policy. Such a contractual provision would prevent the 
Board of Education from amending its policies regarding benefits, compensation, 
personnel, termination, and many other provisions, thus taking away the Board's ability 
to properly and responsibly manage its affairs according to statutory requirements and 
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standards. Moreover, such a provision would be an unlawful limitation on the Board's 
legislative authority. The Board of Education cannot be precluded from amending its 
policies, adopting additional policies, or rescinding existing policies. 
Therefore, the Court concludes that policy GCDA, regarding benefits for part-
time employees of the Board of Education, was in force at the time that Ms. 
Schulthess and Ms. Hadden entered their individual contracts with the Board. 
Individual employees of the school district are bound by policies adopted by the Board 
of Education. The contracts between Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden and the Board 
of Education are enforceable. 
Thus, there being no genuine issues of material fact and it appearing that 
Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment is denied and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted. This Court hereby ORDERS that the plaintiff Park City Education 
Association's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, defendant Park City School 
District's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and plaintiffs Complaint is 
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, each party to bear its own costs. 
DATED this <jj^day of QtL&ef; 1992. 
Adopted June 2 , , 1989 Policy Code GCDA 
JOB SHARING 
Job sharing is a voluntary program providing two or more employees the opportunity to share 
one position. In cases where it is mutually advantageous to both the school district and 
employees, a job-sharing arrangement may be implemented. Wages, fringe benefits, and all 
other benefits shall be prorated on the basis of the time worked as a percent of a full-time 
equivalent position. However, any employee contracted for less than 25 hours per week will not 
be eligible for health and accident insurance coverage. Employees working less than full-time 
will not receive credit for a step increase on the salary schedule the next school year. 
Employees working at least one half-time F.T.E. will receive one full step every two years. 
Teachers who job share should generally teach each day, either morning or afternoon. It will 
not be deemed appropriate to adopt schedules which anticipate long absences of teachers; i.e. 
extended vacations, or additional personal days. Whenever a sharing teacher is absent from 
his/her work as per the pre-arranged schedule, a record of his/her absence will be maintained 
by the principal's office and reported to the payroll office. AH absences will be recorded. 
To assure an orderly process, an application must be submitted no later than the following dates: 
January 15 - Written proposal submitted to principal for the position starting 
at the beginning of the next school year. Each request is for one school year only. 
If applicants are presently sharing a position, they will need to apply each year 
for the continuation of the job-sharing position. All applicants for each position 
must apply as a team. 
February 7 - Written proposal with principal's recommendation submitted to 
the superintendent of schools. 
March - At the first regular Board of Education meeting the written proposal 
with both the principal and superintendent's recommendation will be submitted 
to the Board. 
April 15 - Approval or rejection of written proposal by the Board of Education. 
If a teacher decides he/she would like to share one position and can find another teacher already 
within their school, they should contact their principal before January 15th. If a teacher 
within their school is not interested in job sharing and one teacher would like to find another 
teacher in a school within the district, or outside the district. Policy GCD and Policy GCI will be 
followed. 
Upon Board approval, each applicant must sign a job-share contract for the shared position. 
Each applicant must agree to return to full-time status in the event one of the participants in a 
shared job is unable to continue in the shared assignment. If a teacher on a job-share contract 
is granted a leave of absence, the shared assignment becomes null and void. Each applicant for a 
job-sharing position must be certified to teach those subjects/grade levels involved in the 
shared job. If the teachers or the Board decide to discontinue the job-sharing position at the end 
of a school year, and if there is no other comparable position available in the School District, 
the Board will decide which of the two teachers to retain in accordance with the policies and 
criteria set forth in the Reduction of Professional Staff Work Force Policy, adopted 9/13/88. 
Time necessary for coordination of teaching assignment responsibilities shall be performed on 
the job-sharing teachers' time and not the districts. When teachers have the responsibility for 
the same students both teachers must attend parent/teacher conferences. Both members of 
job-sharing team must attend all faculty meetings, in-service activities, and any other school 
activity requiring other teachers attendance. 
EDUCATIONAL EXCELU 
Park City Schools 
1250 Iron Horse Drive P.O. Box 680310 Park City, Utah S4068 (801)649-9671 
June 28, 1989 
Mrs. Nancy Schulthess 
P. O. Box 680741 
Park City, Utah 84068 
Dear Nancy: 
Congratulations! The Park City Board of Education voted at their 
June 27, 1989, Board Meeting to offer you a one year, job-share, 
second grade teaching position at Parley's Park Elementary School 
under the guidelines of the adopted Job Share Policy No. GCDA. 
You will be issued a formal contract as soon as negotiations are 
settled between P.C.E.A. and the Park City Board of Education. 
You must be appropriately certified for the elementary level and a 
copy of your certificate must be on file in the District Office by 
August 1-5, 1989. 
Sincerely, 
Sandra Hall 
Please sign and/eturn one copy of this letter. 
Signature. 
ana feturn one copy or tnis iett< 
Date £-30 ~$ 
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Park City Schools 
1250 Iron Horse Drive P.O. Box 680310 Park City, Utah S4068 (801)649-9671 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FOR CERTIFIED STAFF 
One Year Job Share Contract 
Nancy Schulthjfess 
P. 0 . Box 680741 
Park City, UT 84068 
The Park City School District Board of Education and the undersigned employee hereby enter 
into an employment contract for the 1989-90 school year based on the certified salary schedule 
LANE: BS, STEP: 4, and a FULL-TIME EQUIVALENCY OF: 0.50. Attached is a 1989-
90 salary schedule. 
1 . The contract will be for the minimum 184 working days as adopted by the Board of 
Education. 
2. In addition, you may be eligible for additional salary. 
3. In the event you have completed less than three (3) consecutive years with the Park City 
School District, your status will be that of a provisional employee. 
4. This contract is void if a valid and appropriate Utah teaching certificate was not on file 
by November 1, 1989. 
5. The Board of Education is bound by the adopted rules and regulations as stipulated in the 
policies and procedures. As an employee, you also agree to be bound by these rules and 
regulations as thevjnay be amended from time to time. 
Attachment 
i 
Park City Board President Employee 
( 
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Date 
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Park. City Schools 
'•;r$e Drives 0. Box 680310 Part; City, Utah W068 (801) 649-9671 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FOR CERTIFIED STAf h 
One Year Job Share Contract 
Margery Hadden 
520 Parkview Drive 
Park City, ! IT 84060 
The Park City School District Board of Education and the undersigned employee hereby enter 
into an employment contract for the 1989-90 school year based on the certified salary schedule 
LANE PS + 55, STEP: 7, and a FIJI L-T1ME EQUIVAi ENCY OFi 0,50 Mtached is a 
" " ~* - - -
r
- schedi He 
1-.. T he contract will be for the minimum 184 working days as adopted by the Board of 
Education, 
2. In addition, ) oi i may be eligible for additional salary. 
3 . In the event you have completed less than three (3) consecutive years v 
School District yot ir status will be that of a provisional employee. 
4. This contract is void if a valid and appropriate Utah teaching certificate was not on file 
by November I, 1989, 
5 . T he Board of Education is bound by the adopted rules and regulations as stipulated in the 
policies and procedures. As an employee, you also agree to be bound by these rules and 
regulations as they may be amended fi or i i time to time 
/. /?' J / Attachrrfent 
^ ^ ^ _ _ MmdUik 
Park City Board President Employe^/ fl I' J 
Date ' 
